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Utilities and the Public Roadway - Just Whose Property is it, Anyway
State and County highway departments are constantly being approached by various 
utilities for permission to locate utilities in public right of ways. Nearly all county roads, the 
majority of which were originally laid out on section lines, but also including those meandering 
wagon roads, were never deeded to the county by the owners of the real estate who owned the 
property upon which the roads were located And, in all but a few cases, no governmental entity 
has ever condemned any property comprising these roads. Therefore, in nearly all cases 
throughout unincorporated areas (and in some incorporated areas) a property owner owns to the 
center of a road.
Inasmuch as a great many of Indiana’s state highways consist of only improved county 
roads, the maintenance of which were taken over by the state from the counties in years gone by, 
the ownership of property abutting these roads is the same as county roads.
The question then arises, when a utility seeks permission of a governmental entity to 
locate its utilities in the public right of way, just what is the “public right of way,” and if the 
governmental entity grants the utility its consent to locate utilities in a public right of way; what is 
the effect of such a permit.
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The courts of Indiana have consistently held that where a road runs through a landowner’s 
property, the landowner owns the road. However, such ownership is subject to the rights of the 
traveling public to use the road if said use has been open and notorious for the last twenty (20) 
years. Of course this still does not answer the question, where the landowner’s title fails to 
contain any grant of record or description of the road, as to how much of the landowner’s 
property is subject to the rights of the traveling public.
In determining how much of a landowner’s property is subject to a public right of way, 
where there has been no condemnation or grant which describes that right of way, Indiana’s court 
have consistently adopted a simple and straightforward rule. The public’s right of way, and thus 
the limits of any governmental entity’s permits given to utilities, is restricted to only that portion 
of the land which is “physically occupied by the road and no more.”
In Anderson v. City of Huntington. 40 Ind.App. 130, 81 N.E. 223 (1907) in addressing 
this issue the court stated:
That the Huntington and Goshen road is a public highway, and was a 
public highway in front of appellant’s property prior to the action of 
the city of Huntington in establishing Jefferson street thereon, cannot 
be controverted. But its width and boundaries never having been 
established and determined by any competent authority, or recorded 
in any proper record, these boundaries must be determined by the use 
by the public. The way cannot be greater than the use. Where the 
boundary lines of a road never have been established by any competent 
authority, but the right of the public to travel over such road has been 
established by continuous usage, the width of such road is determined 
by the width of such use. McCreery v, Fallis (1904), 162 Ind. 255;
Hart v. Trustees, etc. (1860), 15 Ind. 226; Board, etc., v. Huff (18831.
91 Ind. 333; Epler v. Niman (1854), 5 Ind. 459; Elliot, Roads and Sts.
(2d ed ), §§376-386.
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As far back as anyone could remember, the east line of said road, 
as used by the public, had been defined by the fence along the west 
side of appellant’s lot (emphasis supplied.)
Anderson. 40 Ind.App. at 133-134.
Epler v. Niman. 5 Ind. 459, 460 (1854), cited in Anderson, approved an instruction to the 
jury which read as follows:
A road which by twenty years’ use becomes a public highway is of no 
established width by law; but the width as used at the end of twenty years 
cannot legally be intruded upon by any one. (emphasis supplied)
McCreery v. Fallis. 162 Ind. 255, 67 N.E. 673 (1903) made it clear that the state could
not simply decree a wider width for a road right of way than that which had been used by the
public for twenty years. A statute authorizing county commissioners to establish the width of
prescriptive highways, “which width shall not be less than thirty feet,” was construed not to apply
to a road where “the way had only been used to a width varying from twenty-two to twenty-eight
feet.” 162 Ind. at 256 (emphasis supplied). In McCreery the government contended:
That it was an intended legislative authority to ascertain, describe, and 
enter of record highways established by user, regardless of the extent 
of the user, and to fix the width thereof at not less than thirty feet”.
162 Ind. at 257 (emphasis suppled).
The Supreme Court stated, at 162 Ind. 257:
We are forbidden the construction first above suggested, because, not 
only in this case but in a large number of cases, so to hold would be to 
sanction the confiscation of property. . . .
Indiana courts have uniformly protected landowners from confiscation of their property by 
governmental entities attempts to widen roads beyond the limits of the public’s actual use. In 
Elder v. Board of County Comm’rs of Clark County. 490 N.E.2d 362 (Ind.App. 1986), where
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there was “no evidence of any conveyance or condemnation, or of documents to create, locate or 
fix the width off the road, or of any public usage of the road exceeding its previous 21 foot 
width;” and after the county, without permission, took approximately 15 feet of Elder’s yard and 
cut down trees and shrubs to widen the road, Elder sued in inverse condemnation. The trial court 
ruled against him, stating that he had not proven the location of his property boundaries. Elder, 
490 N.E.2d at 363.
The court of Appeals first noted, at 490 N.E.2d 363:
[T]here is no question that Elder owns the land in fee, though there is 
a dispute as to the exact location of its northern boundary. Thus, 
the real issue is whether or not, at some point in time, the land was 
properly appropriated by the County.
The Court then observed that the county admitted it had not condemned the land, but 
claimed a 40 foot right of way existed (whereas the road was 20 to 21 feet wide), based upon 
evidence that the county’s engineer and the county surveyor thought the road, originally a private 
turnpike, had a 40 foot right of way, and two unrecorded survey maps of other land crossed by 
the same road indicated a 40 foot right of way. 490 N.E.2d at 363-364.
The Court of Appeals held that such evidence could not be a lawful basis for finding the
right of way was wider than the road. The Court concluded:
Elder’s title may not be defeated by the evidence adduced by the County.
None of that evidence was recorded in a proper record which would be 
brought into Elder’s abstract as notice of the County’s claim of a 40 
foot right of way. A contrary ruling would drastically disturb settled 
land titles. We further hold that the county owned only that land 
physically occupied by the road and no more, (emphasis suppled)
490 N.E.2d at 365
Occasional mowing of the berm or side ditches by a governmental entity does not extend
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the use of the “traveled way” to include the berm or side ditches.
In Board of Comm'rs. of Monroe County v. Hatton 427 N.E.2d 696, (Ind.App. 1981)
there was evidence that the county had a policy of mowing a strip about three feet wide alongside
the road at least twice a year. The Court held that this maintenance work beyond the traveled
area was insufficient to overcome the basic rule, stating:
Where boundary lines have never been established by competent 
authority, the width of the road established by use is limited to that 
portion actually traveled and excludes any berm or shoulder.
Hatton. 427 N.E.2d at 699.
Thus, the court held, the county did not own (and was not responsible for) the weedy area 
where a 14 year old bicyclist pulled off the road to wait for traffic to clear, even though he was a 
user of the road.
While the issue here involves utilities and the public roadway, as an aside, Hatton 
poignantly illustrates the wisdom of the old adage that one should be careful what one asks for, it 
may be granted. In Hatton, had the court ruled other than as it did, Monroe County could well 
have had to pay for the injuries sustained by the bicyclist. Therefore, prior to a governmental 
entity laying claim to all property between crop rows or fence rows on each side of a road, 
consideration should be given to the fact that with ownership of property comes responsibility and 
legal accountability for injuries sustained on that property - and for environmental contaminations 
which might be located there.
If a governmental entity chooses to permit a public utility (not a private utility) to locate 
its improvements within the boundaries of the traveled roadway, it clearly has the right to do so. 
Colburn v. New Telephone Co.. 156 Ind. 90, 59 N.E. 324 (1901). Therefore, a permit issued by
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the county or state to allow a utility to bore under a road is clearly effective with respect to the 
width of the traveled portion of the road. Likewise, a governmental entity would be within its 
right to permit a public utility to place its utilities parallel with the road, so long as the same are 
located on or in the traveled portion of the road. Were the governmental entity to permit such 
acts however, the potential liability for people being injured as a consequence of those acts is 
staggering.
However, any such permit is ineffective as to that portion of the landowner’s property 
which lies outside the traveled way of the public road and any such permit affords the utility no 
refuge as shown by the latest Indiana case on this subject, Contel of Indiana. Inc, v. Coulson. 659 
N.E.2d 224 (1995), attached.
In view of recent technological advances which have resulted in utilities being desirous of 
burying fiber optic communication lines (some of which produce millions of dollars in revenue a 
day) along side public roads, this issue is going to confront governmental entities more frequently 
in the future. And, given: (1) the fact that Indiana law has consistently limited the definition of a 
public road, or public right of way, only to the traveled portion of the road, (2) the inherent 
liability imposed on a landowner who might accidentally interrupt service of the utility, (3) the 
inherent burden such a utility imposes on future use and development of the property and (4) the 
constraints placed on both corporations and the government by Article 1, Section 21 of Indiana’s 
Constitution:
No person’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; 
nor, except in the case of the State, without such compensation first 
assessed and tendered.
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governmental entities had better acquaint themselves with this body of law and act accordingly in 
issuing permits to utilities.
Should a governmental entity choose to grant a utility a permit, this writer recommends 
one similar to that used by the Morgan County Highway Commission, copy attached. Morgan 
County’s permit provides for indemnification of the county as well as requiring notice to adjoining 
property owners by the utility which receives the permit.
While the writer believes this paper represents an accurate and unbiased representation of 
the state of the law with respect to roads which have not been condemned or conveyed, the law is 
not the same with respect to roads where the road is located on property obtained by 
condemnation or conveyance. As to those roads, any permit issued to a public utility by a 
governmental entity would be effective, so long as the utilities are placed within the boundaries of 
the governmentally owned property. Fox v. Ohio Valiev Gas Corporation. 250 lnd. I l l ,  235 
N.E.2d 168 (1968).
The writer wishes to further inform the reader that he currently and in the past has 
represented landowners in various parts of Indiana who are involved in litigation involving various 
utilities, counties and the State of Indiana, where these matters have been or are being litigated.
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659 N.E.2d 224
CONTEL OF INDIANA, INC., Appellant-Defendant,
v.
Lee COULSON, Beverly Coulson and Zoe Coulson, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
No. 11A01-9503-CV-74.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Dec. 22, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1996.
Property owners brought trespass action against telephone company, after company buried 
fiber optic telephone cable adjacent to public roadway on owners' property under state permit. 
Parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The Clay Circuit Court, Ernest E. Yelton, J., 
granted partial summary judgment for owners, concluding that state had no right-of-way or 
easement beyond traveled portion of roadway. Company appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Najam, J., held that: (1) state's right-of-way for state road over owners' property was coextensive 
with road and did not extend to adjacent property, and (2) fact issue, as to whether and, if so, 
where company might have acquired easement by prescription respecting its telephone lines in 
areas outside state road on owners' property, precluded summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Contel of Indiana, Inc. ("Contel") appeals from the trial court's grant of partial summary 
judgment in favor of Lee Coulson, Beverly Coulson and Zoe Coulson (the "Coulsons") on the 
Coulsons' complaint for trespass. The Coulsons filed suit against Contel after Contel buried fiber 
optic telephone cable adjacent to a public roadway on property owned by the Coulsons. The 
parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court 
entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Coulsons and concluded, as a matter of law, that 




The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it held that the 
State's right-of-way included only the traveled portion of the road.
FACTS
The Coulsons own property in Sullivan County, the boundary of which extends to the center 
of State Road 63, which was formerly a county road. No fee or easement for a right-of-way was 
ever conveyed to the County or the State, but the motoring public has traveled along the roadway 
for many years. The Indiana Department of Transportation issued a permit to Contel to lay
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telephone cable in the State Road 63 right-of-way. In its permit, the State did not indicate the 
width o f the right-of-way. Contel dug trenches and buried approximately two and one-half miles 
o f fiber optic telephone cable along the road in areas which at all times were beyond the paved 
roadway.
The Coulsons filed their complaint against Contel for trespass seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages for Contel's conduct in burying the cable after the Coulsons had advised Contel 
that they owned the property in question. Contel moved for partial summary judgment and 
sought a ruling to determine the width of the State Road 63 right-of-way. The Coulsons filed a 
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the State o f Indiana's 
right-of-way easement over the Coulsons' property included only the traveled portion o f the road, 
excluding any berm or shoulder and, thus, entered partial summary judgment in favor o f the 
Coulsons. At Contel's request, and finding no just reason for delay, the trial court entered final 
judgment on its entry of partial summary judgment. Contel now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION 
Standard of Review
[1][2] Summary judgment may be rendered upon less than all of the issues or claims.
Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 
appellate court is required to apply the same standard applied by the trial court. Equip.
Store, Inc. v. White Farm Equip. Co. (1992), Ind.App., 596 N.E.2d 274, 275. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *227 
Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Lucas v. Stavos (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1114, 1116, tram, denied. 
We resolve any doubt as to fact, or an inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the non­
moving party. Gilliam v. Contractors United, Inc. (1995), Ind.App., 648 N.E.2d 1236, 1238, 
trans. denied.
[3] The fact that both parties request summary judgment does not alter our standard of 
review. Laudig v. Marion County Bd o f Voters Registration (1992), Ind.App., 585 N.E.2d 700, 
704. Rather, "we must separately consider each motion to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Id.
Right-of-Way
[4] Contel contends the trial court erred when it entered partial summary judgment in favor of 
the Coulsons. Specifically, Contel argues that the court erroneously concluded that the State's 
right-of-way covered only the traveled portion o f the road, excluding the land adjacent to the 
paved road. We cannot agree. 5
[5] State Road 63 is a former county road, the maintenance o f which was assumed by the 
State many years ago. No public easement or right-of-way over the Coulsons' property has ever
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been conveyed by instrument or acquired by condemnation. As with most county roads, the 
property rights of abutting landowners extend to the center of the roadway subject only to an 
easement of the public to use the street or highway. S ee  G o rb y  v. M cE n d a rfer  (1963), 135 
Ind.App. 74, 82, 191 N.E.2d 786, 791 (citing Street, Indiana Title to Real Property, s 789). The 
Coulsons do not dispute that the State has a public road right-of-way over a portion of their 
property. The parties disagree, however, on the extent of that right-of-way.
Since there is no record indicating that the State has acquired a right-of-way over the 
Coulsons' property by purchase or condemnation, Indiana law dictates that the State Road 63 
right-of-way must be determined by public use. In A n d erso n  v. C ity  o f  H u n tin g ton  (1907), 40 
Ind.App. 130, 81 N.E. 223, our supreme court recognized that the public right-of-way "cannot be 
greater than the use" and stated:
Where the boundary lines of a road have never been established by any competent authority,
but the right of the public to travel over such road has been established by continuous usage,
the width of such road is determined by the width of such use.
Id. at 133, 81 N.E. at 224; see  E va n s  v. B ow m an  (1915), 183 Ind. 264, 267, 108 N.E. 956, 
958. More recently, this court has recognized that the width of a road established by use is 
limited to that portion actually traveled and excludes any berm or shoulder. Bd. o f  C om m 'rs o f  
M o n ro e  C ou n ty  v. H a tto n  (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 696, 699. In H atton , the plaintiff 
sought to establish that the County either owned or had assumed responsibility to maintain an area 
adjacent to a county road and had a corresponding common law duty in negligence in connection 
with the land. We noted that neither a record of county ownership of the adjacent areas nor any 
legal description of the road itself could be found, "which is a common situation for highways 
established by use." Id .at 699. Thus, we determined that there was no evidence to support a 
reasonable inference of County ownership or responsibility for the areas adjacent to the traveled 
portion of the roadway. Id.
Similar to the present case, in E ld e r  v. Bd. o f  C o u n ty  C o m m 'rs  o f  C la rk  C ou n ty  (1986), 
Ind.App., 490 N.E.2d 362, trans. den ied , a landowner sued the County in inverse condemnation. 
The County had cut down trees and shrubs on the plaintiffs property adjacent to a public road in 
an attempt to widen the paved roadway from approximately 20 feet to 40 feet. The County 
asserted it had a 40 foot right-of-way in the area despite the fact that the width of the paved road 
had always been 20 feet. In E lder, we noted the longstanding Indiana precedent that the width of 
the right-of-way is determined by the public use. Id. at 364; A n d erso n , at 133, 81 N.E. at 224; 
M c C r e e ry  v. F a llis  (1903), 162 Ind. 255, 67 N.E. 673; B d  o f  C om m 'rs  v. H u ff  (1883), 91 Ind. 
333; H a rt v. T ru stees (1860), 15 Ind. 226; E p le r  v. N im an  (1854), 5 Ind. 459. Although the 
County produced the *228 testimony of the county surveyor and several survey maps in support 
of its claimed right-of-way, we held that the evidence presented by the County was insufficient as 
none was recorded in a proper record which would be brought into the landowner's abstract as 
notice of the County's claim of a 40 foot right-of-way. E lder, 490 N.E.2d at 365. We decided 
that a contrary ruling would drastically disturb settled land titles. Id. (FN2)
Here, we agree with the trial court and conclude that the State Road 63 right-of-way is
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coextensive with the paved roadway. There is no evidence to show that the public has ever 
"traveled" on the land adjacent to the roadway. S H atton , 427 N.E.2d at 699. Neither the 
State nor the County has ever acquired a right-of-way to property adjacent to the roadway by 
conveyance or condemnation, and no additional right-of-way has been acquired by use. No 
markers have ever been placed on the Coulsons' property to show that the State claimed a right- 
of-way beyond the pavement. Indeed, when it granted Contel the permit to bury telephone lines, 
the State did not indicate the actual extent of its right-of-way. The State merely granted Contel 
permission to bury its telephone cable within the public road right-of-way, which we have 
determined includes only the paved road.
[6] Still, Contel, a public utility which provides telephone service, maintains that the use of 
modem fiber optic cable creates a common good and that the State's grant of authority to Contel 
was sufficient to allow its utility installation along State Road 63. Contel cites several Indiana 
cases in support of its position, each of which is distinguishable from the instant case in that, the 
utility or governmental entity had established an easement or right-of-way over the property in 
question. In its argument, Contel circumvents the central issue of this appeal by assuming that its 
actions were done within the public right-of-way and with authority of the State. Where a fee is 
already subject to an easement for highway purposes, a utility may use a public right-of-way 
without the consent of the servient landowner who claims that such utility work is an additional 
burden on the fee. R itz  v. In d ia n a  a n d  O h io  R.R. (1994), Ind.App., 632 N.E.2d 769, 775, trans. 
d en ied . Here, however, the public right-of-way extends only to the paved roadway. Contel 
received from the State's permit only those rights which the State had and no more. Therefore, 
Contel could not have obtained from the State, without the Coulsons' consent, authority to bury 
its cable beyond the traveled portion of State Road 63.
Finally, Contel asserts that the Coulsons have specifically recognized that the State has an 
easement beyond that of the roadway. Contel argues that the Coulsons have failed to object to 
prior acts by the State in mowing and maintaining the shoulder areas along the road on their 
property. The State's authority and responsibility to maintain public roads gives rise to an 
occasional need to enter the property adjacent to the traveled roadway to mow and to maintain 
ditches and culverts. Its authority, however, is not derived from an easement or right-of-way. 
Rather, the State's authority is based on an implied license to enter the land for a limited purpose.
[7] [8][9] Unlike an easement or right-of-way, a license merely confers a personal privilege to 
do some act or acts on land without conveying an estate in the land. S ee  In d u s tr ia l D isp o sa l v. 
C ity  o f  E a s t C h ic a g o  (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1203, 1205. While an easement possesses 
the qualities of inheritability and assignability, these qualities are generally inconsistent with a 
license. Id. Further, use of land under a mere license cannot ripen into an easement, regardless of 
how long that use is continued. G reen co , Inc. v. M a y  (1987), Ind.App., 506 N.E.2d 42, 46. The 
occasional, intermittent entry by the State on the property adjacent to the roadway merely to 
maintain areas appurtenant to the roadway did not establish a public right-of-way in those areas.
Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the State Road 63 right-of-way as *229. 
established by public use extends only to the paved portion of the roadway. The trial court's 
partial summary judgment was correct on the issue presented by the cross-motions of the parties.
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However, a determination of the width of the State's right-of-way does not necessarily resolve the 
issue of whether Contel had an independent prescriptive right to bury its long distance cable on 
the Coulsons' property.
Prescriptive Easement
[10][11][12] A prescriptive easement is established by actual, open, notorious, continuous, 
uninterrupted, adverse use for 20 years under a claim of right, or by continuous adverse use with 
the knowledge and acquiescence of the servient landowner. S ee  IND.CODE s 32-5-1-1; B a u er  
v. Harris(1993), Ind. App., 617 N.E.2d 923, 927. We agree with the Coulsons that the presence
of other utilities in the area adjacent to the road does not establish an easement in favor of Contel. 
A prescriptive easement is limited to the purpose for which it is created and cannot be extended 
by implication. Id. at 931. However, it is undisputed that Contel had previously buried local 
telephone lines between State Road 63 and the Coulsons' fence or crop line prior to Contel's 
action of burying the fiber optic long distance lines. (FN3) Although the Coulsons maintain that 
they do not object to the local lines, in determining whether Contel has a prescriptive easement, 
we decline to recognize a distinction between its local cable and long distance cable.
It is unclear from the record how long the Contel local lines have existed on the Coulsons' 
property or the exact location of the local lines in relation to the new fiber optic cable. (FN4) At 
trial, it remains to be determined whether or not Contel or its predecessor in interest acquired a 
prescriptive easement for telephone lines over any part of the Coulsons' property.
We affirm the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of the width of the 
State Road 63 right-of-way, noting, however, that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial 
concerning whether and, if so, where Contel may have acquired an easement by prescription.
Affirmed.
BAKER and GARRARD, JJ., concur.
FN1. We heard oral argument on November 28, 1995, at Indiana State University in Terre Haute.
FN2. In E lder, this court further held that the County owned only that land physically occupied by 
the road and no more. Id. at 365. We note that in E lder, unlike here, the landowner's property 
line did not extend to the center of the roadway. He had significantly fewer rights than do the 
Coulsons as he owned only that land lying south of the southern edge of the road.
FN3. The record also shows that Contel replaced some of the old local lines at the same time as it 
was burying the long distance lines.
FN4. The Coulsons assert that while Contel placed its long distance lines next to the pre-existing 
local line in some areas, in other areas the long distance cable is not even on the same side of 
State Road 63 as the pre-existing lines.
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MORGAN COUNTY HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT
5400 Blue Bluff Rond 
Martinsville, Indiana 46151
Permit
For Underground Transmission Devices on County Right of Way
Permittee: Phone No:
Signature: Title:
Address: County Use Only
Permit No.______
Bond No. _____
Approval Date _  
Completion Date
I,ocntlon: Application is hereby made for permission to install and thereafter maintain
(fully describe proposed work)
on or along county Road (s)
(Give road on which work is to be performed Sc distance to nearest intersection)
length: Totals included in this Permit Application
________ feet of installed line (on County Right of Way) ________  road cuts
________ road bores (County roads only - do not include private drives)
________ bridge or overpass attachments
Responsibility:
In accordance with Morgan County Ordinance 6-3-2, the applicant agrees to post the financial
guarantee (bond,letter of credit or identifying agreement) in Section 6-3-2.4 and the following:
1) the satisfactory repair of any and all excavated areas and maintenance of same for one year 
after the Certificate of Compliance is approved.
2) installation and maintenance of barricades, signs, lights, etc., and all traffic control (flagmen, 
etc.) in accordance with the latest edition of the Indiana Manual o f Uniform Traffic Devices 
(IMUTCU).
3) indemnify and save harmless the County, its agents and employees for any and all claims for 
damages or actions arising out of the work performed under this Permit and the continuing 
uses by the Permittee, including but not limited to constructing, reconstructing, maintaining 
and using said utility lines approved under this Permit.
4) keep a copy of this Permit with each work crew while work is in progress and present it upon 
request of any County official.
Road School Proceedings - Page 57
5) notify all law enforcement and emergency agencies (police, fire, ambulance, etc.) in the event 
that any lane closings arc required for the work performed under this Permit.
6) remove and/or relocate any facilities covered by this Permit when required by the County 
for performance of construction or maintenance activities on county highway right of way.
Removal and/or relocation of facilities in county highway right of way shall be at the sole 
expense of the Permittee except as provided for by applicable statutes.
7) attach to this application the Notification Form which provides for notification of property 
owners adjacent to the right of way where work is performed.
8) attach to this application drawings or sketches showing the work to be done and its location.
9) contact Morgan County Highway Department upon completion of the project.
Conditions: The following conditions apply to granting of this Permit -
1) this Permit will be valid for three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date of approval.
If the work covered by this Permit is not completed within this time a new Permit will be 
required.
2) this Permit is valid only for work on Morgan County Highway right of way. Permittee shall 
obtain approval from appropriate agencies for work inside incorporated areas of the County 
and secure consent by easement or other legal document from abutting property owners for 
work performed outside the Highway right of way.
3) this Permit in no way relieves the Permittee from meeting all applicable federal, state, and local laws.
4) all lines crossing beneath County roads shall be bored unless special permission is granted in Item 5 
below.
5) ___________________________________________________________________________
Approval: This Permit application is approved subject to the requirements set out in Morgan County Ordinance 
6-3-2 and the conditions specified herein.
______________________________________________  Date:
County Highway Engineer or Superintendent
Original - Applicant One Copy - Engineer's File
Road School Proceedings - Page 58
